Introduction
The advent and fast growth of the Internet economy has been accompanied by innovation in the traditional forms of financial payments. These changes have been propelled on the one hand by the emergence of new commercial relations conveyed through the Internet which require new and secure modes of payments -e.g. digital market places and e-commerce. On the other hand, traditional markets and industries have experienced the diffusion of such business practices within their procurement and marketing activities (Lerner 2004) .
The potential benign impact of innovation in the payment and financial systems is very high and it goes well beyond the banking sector. It is worth remembering that changes in the short term payment and financial systems were at the base -among others -of the commercial revolution in Europe during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986 ). More recently other scholars have suggested that innovation in payment and financial systems has some of the features of a General Purpose Technology (GPT) (Hall 2007) . GPTs are technologies characterized by use in a wide range of sectors, the need for complementary investment when adopted, and scope for productivity enhancement in diverse sectors of the economy, leading to increasing returns on both the supply and demand side (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995) .
Patenting in this area has increased significantly in the last two decades. According to evidence documented by Hall (2007) 'as such', that is, methods that are independent of a particular physical embodiment (State Street v. Signature Financial 1998 , ATT v. Excel 1998 .
1 Such patents have proved particularly contentious and subject to litigation, especially those related to financial innovations (Lerner, 2006) .
At the EPO the treatment of software and intangible business methods is different, with these inventions "as such" excluded from patentable subject-matter according to the European Patent Convention (Article 52). Nevertheless, when Hall, Thoma and Torrisi (2007) analyzed a large dataset of EPO patents, they found an increasing number of what appeared to be software-related patents during the 1990s. This suggests that, despite the different legal environment, barriers to patenting on software and intangible business methods may have fallen somewhat in Europe as well. This process has been reinforced by some conflicting decisions at the various national European courts and the European Court of Justice.
Here as in most areas, the strengthening of patent coverage can have both positive and negative effects. On the one hand, it can increase the incentive to devote resources to inventive activity. On the other hand, it may discourage or raise the cost of combining and recombining of inventions to make new products and processes, in particular in cumulative innovations such as GPTs and technologies that are part of a standard setting process (see, among others, Scotchmer 1996, Cohen and Lemley, 2002; Lemley 2007) . These considerations are of particular relevance for financial patents and software and business methods in general (Hall 2003) .
In the USPTO context the heterogeneity of the actors involved in financial patents can be seen along a number of dimensions (Hall 2007) . About 20 per cent of the patentees are alliances or R&D consortia of financial firms, suggesting the importance of the standards setting process in payment and financial systems. Other patentees are older and larger firms active in non-financial and non-software sectors such as oil and gas or machinery. Newer patentees are typically small firms and only three of them -E-Trade, eBay, and Verisignhave more than one billion dollars of revenue annually by 2005. Another dimension of heterogeneity is the importance of financial patents relatively to the overall portfolio of the 3 patentee: only 0.7% of patents in this class are granted to firms that specialize in financial patenting, whereas the remaining patents are held by large patentees that operate in a number of other sectors such as Exxon Mobil, Chevron, NCR, Lockheed Martin, Diebold, etc. This picture is quite similar to that of software-related patents, a large proportion of which are held by non-software firms.
Following on the results for the U.S., in this paper we look at the ways in which European firms are dealing with the increase of financial patenting, given the differences they face in patentability in their home markets. Some exploratory questions that we would like to answer are the following:
1. Are financial patents issued at the EPO? How could they be defined? What definitions might be useful and robust in obtaining USPTO and EPO data on financial patents? 
Defining Financial Patents
To identify a financial patent in EPO we employ three different methods: A) EPO equivalents of USPTO patents in certain finance-related class/subclass combinations; B) EPO patents in a set of IPC/ECLA finance-related classifications; and C) EPO patents in technology classes where "pure play" financial firms patent.
The first set of financial patents (Set A) relies on Hall (2007) and Lerner (2006) Therefore we employed an extension of the IPC -the ECLA classification -which is administrated by the EPO and is about twice as detailed as the IPC. 4 On the one hand, we used the Concordance Table provided by the USPTO (see previous paragraph) to choose the ECLA codes related to the IPCs corresponding the USPC classes of Hall (2007) and Lerner (2006) . On the other hand we identified those ECLA codes in which the EPO equivalents of the US financial patents were classified. In particular we considered the top ten groups of 2 For the US patent documents the source is www.uspto.gov, visited August 16 th , 2008; for the EPO equivalents we used PATSTAT version October 2007. There is a lag of approximately 1.5 years between the release of PATSTAT and the documents retrieved from the USPTO website. We plan to update these data in a later version of the paper.
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ECLA codes which contain about 78 per cent of the EPO equivalents of the US financial patents.
So doing we identified the following ECLA codes that could be considered appropriate as financial system-related patents in EPO (for the description see Appendix 2): G06Q20/00; G06F21/00N9A2P; G07F7/02; G07F7/08; G07F7/10D; G07F7/10E; and H04L9/32. This subset of patents consists of circa 2,803 patent documents which are referred to as SET B in Table 1 .
The third criterion used to define a financial patent was based on an analysis of the patenting activity of 'pure play' firms, that is, firms that specialize in financial services or software. To identify pure play firms we started with a list provided by Hall (2007) for the US patentees, and for the largest European patentees we considered those classified in investment banking and securities dealing (NAICS activity 523110) (see Appendix 3 for more details). 5 We then retrieved all patent applications filed by these firms in the EPO. So doing we find about 452 patents that could be related to financial innovations, since they are filed by firms specialized in the financial services sectors. This group of EPO patents is labeled as SET C in Table 1. 6 
Source: Our elaborations using USPTO and EPO datasets
The results of this complex search procedure are illustrated in Figure 1 . The union of the three search criteria yields 4370 patent applications in EPO, but the intersection yields only one patent. 7 The largest similarity across methods is obtained when SET A and SET B are 5 For European firms we considered only NAICS 523110 because the other NAICS related to market of financial services are characterized by the presence of many holding companies of large industrial groups. 6 In the next version of this paper, Set C will be modified to include all the class/subclass areas where the chosen set of "pure play" firms patent, as in Graham and Mowery (2004) . 6 taken together, yielding an intersection of about 217 patents (which account for 16.1% of patents in SET A and 7.7% in SET B). Moreover, there is a very small intersection between SET C and the other two sets. This evidence points to the fact that the three search methods may include patents unrelated to financial innovations, and also that most of these patents are not held by pure play firms.
Hence, to minimize the number of false positives (Type I error) at this preliminary stage of the analysis, we analyzed the text of the titles and abstracts of the selected patents and restricted our sample only to patent documents having as words or sub-words (e.g., wallet in electronic-wallet) at least one these keywords: transaction, financial, credit, payment, money, debit card, portfolio, and wallet.
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After this further refining of financial patent definition, our sample was reduced to about 1,225 patent applications at the EPO (see Table 2 ). This constitutes the final set of financial patents. Table 2 shows a greater similarity across the results obtained with the three different definitions. and 1995, which are the years of the main software patentability decisions in the U.S., and also the years during which use of the internet took off in that country. Roughly speaking both in the EPO and USPTO, by 2006, there were three times as many patents as in 1991 overall, and six times as many financial patents.
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[ Figure 1 about here]
[ Figure 2 about here]
Note also that at the end of the period (after about 2001), there is a substantial falling off in all types of patents, due to the lag between priority year and publication (at the EPO) or grant (at the USPTO). Nevertheless, there also appears to be real decline in the growth rate of patent applications at both offices.
Which firms take out financial patents?
This section describes the characteristics of the patentees who take out financial patents at the EPO, using the combined definition of sets A, B, and C described above. 11 We look at the following characteristics: country of origin (Table 3) , business sector (Table 4) , size of firm (Table 5) , size and age of firm (Table 6 ) and sector and age of firm (Table 7) . We also present a list of the 50 largest financial patenters in Table 8 and discuss their profile. It is difficult to be completely precise, as the EPO data is based on applications, and the USPTO data on granted patents by date of first priority.
11 There are a total of 1174 patents in our sample after excluding those granted so recently that we do not have all the data for them yet. Of these, about 70 have more than one applicant (in a few cases more than two). In Tables 4 and 5 we have included all the applicants, so the total number of observations is 1261. In Tables 6-9 we included only those applicants that were in the business sector, excluding individuals and government applicants, for a total number of observations equal to 1090, corresponding to 1039 patent documents.
8 differences in the treatment of financial and business method patents between the US patent system and other systems. Another plausible explanation is the high intensity of financial innovations in the US economy vis-à-vis other economies.
The share of financial patents held by US patentees rose during the 1990s and then fell somewhat after that as European applicants increased their share. About two-thirds of European-owned financial patents come from the largest three countries, the UK, Germany, and France. It is also noteworthy that very few of these patents come from firms outside the US, EU, and Japan.
[ Table 3 about here] Table 4 depicts the distribution of financial patents by the main activity of the patentee. We used different sources to identify the main activity of the applicant, successfully obtaining this information for about 97% of the financial patents. 12 There is a very high concentration of patents in a few sectors: in particular, only six sectors account for about 65% of the financial patents overall, with four of them being services -software, financial services, telecommunications, and other business services -and the remaining computer-related hardware. This is in line with the concentration of software patents reported by Hall, Thoma and Torrisi (2007) .
The concentration of patents in these six sectors is higher in the US than in the EU.
Moreover, the two leading sectors in Europe differ significantly from the ones in the US: in the former case telecommunication firms and producers of communications equipment are responsible for 39% of the business sector financial patents, whereas in the US firms in the software and financial sectors hold 55% of them. In Europe, firms in the financial sector account for only 9.8% of business sector financial patents. The differences in distribution doubtless reflects the strength of the telecommunications sector relative to the software and computing sector in Europe vis-à-vis the US.
[ Table 4 about here] [ Figure 3 about here]
Another important dimension of industrial dynamics is firm size. 13 Table 5 shows that the majority of financial patents are obtained by large patentees: however their role decreased somewhat after 1999 in favor of the small-sized firms. Moreover, the small patentees are concentrated in a few sectors. Indeed, about 78% of the financial patents held by small sized firms are held by firm in three service sectors -software, financial and other business services -whereas these sectors account for less than half (40%) of patents filed by large firms.
[ Table 5 about here]
The small patentees operating in the service sectors are also new firms: firms born after year 1995 account for about 75% of the financial patents by small patentees, whereas their role in the overall patenting is minimal. In contrast, the great majority of patents held by large firms are held by firms that were founded prior to 1970, as one might expect.
[ Table 6 about here]
Typically the emergence of the smaller firms active in financial patenting is associated with the advent of the so-called Internet economy. Their business models often rely on licensing transactions and financial models embodied in a software application that uses non-exclusive technology contracts. This can be seen in Table 7 , where firms founded after 1990 that take out financial patents are more likely to be found in the service sector. In contrast, a large share of the communication equipment and telecommunications firms that have financial patents were born during the 1981-1990 period with the advent of wireless and cell telephony.
[ Table 7 about here]
A higher propensity to patent is consistent with the active participation in technology markets, where IP protection of the goods being traded is important. Ongoing research has not yet reached a definitive conclusion on the sustainability in the long run of such business strategy. However, the development of specialized technology providers in the financial area could be considered a quintessential example of the vertical disintegration that takes place when ownership of innovation assets becomes available (Arora et al. 2007) . Some examples can be found in Table 8 , where we show the approximately 50 largest patenters in our sample. Although the majority of firms listed are old and large firms, a few new entrants such as Bitwallet (electronic money service provider in Japan), Orbis Patents (patent holding company in Ireland), Trintech (transaction software provider in Ireland) and Contentguard (DRM technology in the US) can be seen.
[ Table 8 about here]
Analysis of patent documents
In this section the characteristics of financial patents are compared with other business methods patents and also with total patents at the EPO, in order to explore potential differences regarding the prior art base and possibly the economic value of the two kinds of patenting.
To identify a representative comparison set of business methods patents in EPO we adopted an approach similar to Wagner (2008) . First, as described previously, we found the patents related to business methods in USPTO by including those patents having at least one technological class 705 and/or 902. So doing we found 18,244 documents, reduced to 8,695
US patents after excluding those related to financial patents as defined by Hall (2007) and Lerner (2006) . Using these patents, we retrieved all the EPO equivalents obtaining a subset of 1,232 business methods patents. To form a comparison group of all patents we took a random 0.1% sample of the EPO database (excluding business method and financial patents), obtaining 1,828 patents.
Because most of the variables we consider will vary systematically over time, and because financial and business method patents are disproportionately represented in the later years, we normalized each of the variables by its overall year mean before performing the tests for differences between the two samples. Tables 9 and 10 show the results of our analysis: Table   9 contains some simple statistics on the unadjusted data for the three sets of patents, and 11 The upper panels of Tables 9 and 10 on the other hand, it may suggest that the patent is more derivative in its nature or that it is in a crowded technological area and so has narrow breadth. Our indicators suggest that financial patents rely to a lesser extent on non-patent prior art than business method patents but the same amount as other patents, and also that they cite more patents than either business method or other patents. They are cited more slowly than business method patents (after about 60.5 months against 53.7 months), and more quickly than patents as a whole (66.6 months). Note that in many ways financial patents are more similar to other patents than to other business method patents.
[ Tables 9 and 10 about here]
The lower panel of Tables 9 and 10 shows some indicators that are commonly associated with patent value: the number of IPCs in which the patent is classified, the number of patents in the rest of the world with the same priority date (the number of equivalents), the number of countries in which coverage was requested at the EPO, the number of citations received by the patent in the first three years after grant, the number of divisionals (continuations) at the EPO associated with the patent, and the number of inventors on the patent document.
14 In the EPO the task of the examiner consists not only in the identification of patent documents that can be considered prior art for a given patent application, but also in the classification of the prior art patent(s) by degree of importance to that patent application. The categories X and Y signal that at least one claim of the patent application overlaps completely or partially with at least one claim of the prior art patent(s). Other categories are possible and this set of information is articulated in the so called "Search Report".
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The typical business method patent has slightly more inventors than the typical financial patent (2.8 versus 2.5), but financial patents are not significantly different from other patents.
Family sizes do not differ much at all across the three groups and continuations differ in distribution when adjusted by the priority year, but not by mean. Other measures of private value -such as the number of designated countries and the number of citations in the first three years -show that financial patents are ranked somewhat higher that the other business method patents and very significantly higher than all other patents. However the composite index of family size, citations, and the number of IPCs does not differ across the groups, probably because it has very high variance within each group. 15 Note that the higher rate at which these patents are cited may indicate higher social economic value as well as higher private value.
Financial patents are classified into significantly more IPC classes than the other business method patents and significantly fewer than all patents. This is a bit surprising, since business methods and software inventions are excluded from the patentability 'as such' in EPO according to art. 52 of the statute, and hence there is a lack in EPO of a clear technological classification regarding this type of patenting; nevertheless, this seems to lead the examiner to place the patent in fewer rather than more classes.
Outcomes at the EPO
Most of the analysis in this paper is based on the published patent documents on the EPO website. These documents are patent applications that may ultimately be rejected, withdrawn, or granted by the EPO. One indicator of the "quality" or eligibility of these financial inventions for patenting is their experience in the EPO examining and granting process. In Table 11 , we show some simple statistics on this question for our three groups of patents.
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The first question is whether a decision has yet been rendered by the EPO. For three quarters of all patents, the answer is yes, but for financial and business method patents, there are somewhat fewer decisions, probably because their applications are somewhat newer.
15 The composite value index described in Hall, Thoma and Torrisi (2007) uses the factor analysis to build a synthetic measure from three patent indicators, such as family size, forward citations, and the number of IPC classes at 8 digits level. This composite index revealed to be predictive of the market value of the firm after controlling for several other variables in a sample representing about 1000 largest R&D doers across European publicly listed firms. The index draws on a methodology first adopted by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) . 16 For this table, it was feasible to use all patents to compute the shares rather than a sample of patents.
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The possible outcomes for an application are that it is granted, that the EPO refuses it, or that the applicant withdraws it after negotiation with the EPO. The decision to withdraw a patent application can be often be considered equivalent to having received a rejection. In this way, the patentee can preempt a potential rejection decision of the examiner after the dispatch of the results of the examination process (Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Lazaridis, 2007) . Table 11 shows clearly that conditional on a decision having been reached, financial patents are far less likely to be granted than either business method or other patents, indicating that the EPO is finding these applications unpatentable more often than other patents, which is probably related to the subject matter restriction of art. 52.
[ Table 11 about here]
The final step in the EPO process before the patent becomes a set of national patent rights that can be enforced in national courts is the 9 month post-grant window during which any third party may file an opposition against the patent showing that it should not have been into three periods corresponding roughly to changes in the patenting regime, we find that in the most recent period the difference in oppositions rates between financial and business method patents and patents overall is much smaller than previously. 
Exploring the determinants of EPO outcomes
In order to disentangle how the characteristics of the patentee and the invention impact on the variability of the outcomes described in the previous section, we estimated a series of probit equations for the probability of a decision conditional on an application, a grant conditional on a decision, and opposition conditional on a grant. Controlling for average differences across time, the decision variable could be considered an indicator of quality of the original application and the speed with which the patentee pursues the application. The grant is first and foremost an indicator of invention quality, and also of whether it is viewed as satisfying the subject matter restrictions. Finally, opposition has been shown repeatedly to be an indicator of the economic value and importance of the patented invention (Harhoff et al. 2003, Harhoff and Reitzig 2004) .
The explanatory variables for these equations are in two sets, those associated with the patent owner, and those associated with the patent. The first group are the following:
-Log stock of EP patents of the patentee (depreciated at 15% annual rate)
-Log stock of XY backward citations by EP patents of the patentee (depreciated at 15%
annual rate)
-Log stock of cite-weighted EP patents of the patentee (depreciated at 15% annual rate, first 3 years only), normalized by the stock of patents -Size of the patentee (small, medium, large)
-Age of the patentee (3 dummies for firms that were founded prior to 1981, between 1981 and 1995, and after 1995) . Preliminary explorations showed including a more detailed set of dummies lowered precision but did not change the results.
-Sector of the patentee (7 dummies for the 6 leading sectors plus the remainder) -Country of the patentee (6 dummies for US, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, and the remainder)
The patent characteristics included are the following:
-Total backward cites in the patent document -XY backward cites in the patent document -Forward cites received by the patent in the first 3 years -Log number of inventors listed on the patent, as a proxy for the intensity of R&D expenditures supporting the inventive project that has generated the patents.
-Log number of designated states for the patent at the EPO -Priority year dummies: we used the five year time intervals discussed by Wagner Turning first to the probability of obtaining a decision on patentability at the EPO, controlling for priority year the most important predictors among the owner characteristics are the quality of the firm's prior inventions as proxied by average citations per patent, whether the firm is German (positive) or Japanese (negative). A patent with more inventors or more designated states is less likely to have received a decision, which suggests that more valuable financial patents that have more resources behind them take longer to issue or be rejected, other things equal. This may reflect the applicant's willingness to extend the process at the EPO when more is at stake. Note that size, age, and sector of patentee do not seem to matter for receiving a decision, which is somewhat encouraging.
Once a decision has been reached, however, the probability of grant is more affected by the characteristics of the patent owner. Although size of firm does not matter in the presence of the size of the firm's patent portfolio, sector, country and to a lesser extent age do matter.
Experience matters: a doubling of the firm's patent portfolio is associated with a 10 per cent increment in the probability that a financial patent is granted. Firms in software, telecommunications, and computing equipment experience a higher probability of receiving a financial patent grant than firms in finance, insurance, or other business sectors. This may reflect the nature of the patent applications in different sectors: those in the ICT sectors are more likely to be for the kinds of software-hardware combinations that are viewed as patentable subject matter by the EPO.
US patent owners (who presumably are more likely to have patent applications outside the art. 52 restrictions but acceptable to the USPTO) are 18 per cent less likely to receive a grant of their financial patent application. Looking at the patent characteristics themselves, more inventors and more designated states increase the likelihood of a grant once a decision has been reached, even if they delay the decision. Again, this is consistent with greater effort by the patentee when more is at stake.
The final column reports on the predictors of opposition conditional on grant. Unfortunately, the sample size is fairly small and the results therefore somewhat weaker than some of those in the literature. It is noteworthy that patent owner characteristics do not predict the probability that a particular patent is opposed, with the possible exception of the firm's stock of previous X or Y backward citations. That is, firms whose patents have low inventive steps or firms that have patents in a crowded space are less likely to find their patents opposed. In general, patents with low inventive steps have a limited threatening effect and therefore are less likely to be opposed. In the specific case of firms operating in technological areas where mutual blocking is common and where the cross-licensing solution is used, opposition is a less useful strategy Ziedonis 2001, von Graevenitz et al. 2008) . Note however, that if the patent in question has X or Y backward cites, it is more likely to be opposed, probably because there is some controversy over the extent of the inventive step above a competitor's patent. It is worth to note that financial patents on average receive more forward citations and contain a large number of XY type backward citations than other patents (see Table 9 ). This evidence also suggests that financial inventions are characterized by a particularly high cumulativeness and IP fragmentation. An additional X or Y cite adds 2.5 per cent to the probability that a patent will be opposed. Finally, as others have found before us, more highly cited patents are more likely to be opposed; both variables have been shown repeatedly to be value indicators and financial patents are no exceptions.
[ Tables 12a and b 
Licensing of financial innovations
As we discussed previously the financial payment industry has seen a proliferation of specialized technology providers of payment systems and their components. In this section we report on some individual case studies in order to explore the market for payment systems technology the business models of these firms further.
To identify the licensing strategies of the financial patentees we searched their websites, along with Google and Reuters newswires for the keyword "license" and analyzed the pages retrieved. Often these documents are very rich, including business and demographic information both for the licensor and the licensee. Table 13 shows the year of first license, major industries served and the type of technology contract for about 30 patentees randomly chosen from those that have licensed out at least once.
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[ Table 13 about here]
The Note that the use of exclusive contracts is more widespread across the financial services segment than for the computer and communication equipment. This difference can be explained by the fact that the adoption of new forms of payment can be a competitive advantage for the financial services firms whereas the hardware is more commodity-like. In the segment of computer and communication equipment there is greater variation in technology contracts. Indeed when technologies are characterized by different level of generality, the licensor should choose the form of contract that maximizes its payoff. When the licensor holds a sufficient general technology, even a low share of royalties coming from non-exclusive contracts can ensure significant profits (see the study of Gambardella and Giarratana (2008) regarding the software encryption industry).
In our future research we will collect more detailed information on a representative sample of specialized technology providers with the aim of finding data on the price of technological deals. This would contribute to our further validate our preliminary findings on the economic (private) value of financial patents.
Conclusions
We have analyzed financial patents in the European Patent Office. To our knowledge, this is among the first studies exploring this component of business methods patents based on European data. This paper draws on earlier studies on USPTO patents and proposes a new definition of financial patents. Although in the EPO system software 'as such' and business methods are excluded from the patentable subject matter, we found a substantial number of such patents in the European system. Clearly, to be patented at the EPO these inventions should yield some technical effects and some financial inventions like payment technologies indeed have links with electronic (hardware) devices, such as a wireless systems. However, it is often difficult to establish a clear border between patentable inventions and business methods.
Our preliminary investigation shows that financial patents are different from other business methods on several grounds such as references to non-patent literature (NPL) and backward citations to other patents. The differences with other patents are less marked when we look at various indicators of prior art contained in financial patents. However, both financial and business method patents have higher opposition rates vis-à-vis all patents and this may be due to a higher uncertainty surrounding these subject matters especially in Europe. Moreover, compared with other patents, the average financial patent has a number of Designated Countries and receives a number of citations larger than other business method patents and very significantly higher than all other patents.
Then we have explored the characteristics of financial patentees. First, firms from few sectors (computers, telecommunication equipment, finance and insurance, and software) account for the bulk of financial patents. Second, large firms maintain a large, albeit declining share of these patents while small, young firms have a smaller, but rising share of these patents. Small firms include some specialized technology firms whose business model is largely based on technology licensing.
Finally we have analyzed how the main characteristics of the patentee and the invention impact on the outcome of the examiner's decision and probability of receiving an opposition.
First we find that the probability of grant for financial patent applications -rather than reject semiconductors. In our future research we will explore more thoroughly the differences between financial patents by different types of firms. Moreover, we will examine the differences in patent exploitation strategies between specialized technology firms and vertically integrated firms. Our preliminary analysis shows that specialized technological firms are heavily involved in licensing out of financial patents.
Appendix on Data and Sources
Our analysis is based on multiple sources. 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 The left out category is a patent owned by a large firm in the rest of the world that was founded before 1981, and that operates in one of the remaining business sectors, with priority year prior to 1986 (prior to 1991 in the first set of columns).
Indicators of Patent Value

0.325
1041 observations for 407 patentees (692 decisions, 320 grants, 38 oppositions out of 303 pre-2001 grants) Marginal effects and their standard errors clustered on patentee are shown. Significance at 1% *** 5% ** 10% *. + These variables are stocks for all the firm's patents as of the priority year of the current patent, constructed using a 15% depreciation rate. # All patent characteristics excluding the priority year dummies, which control for selection over time. Marginal effects and their standard errors clustered on patentee are shown. Significance at 1% *** 5% ** 10% *. + These variables are stocks for all the firm's patents as of the priority year of the current patent, constructed using a 15% depreciation rate. # All patent characteristics excluding the priority year dummies, which control for selection over time.
Decision Grant conditional on decision Opposition conditional on grant
The left out category is a patent owned by a large firm in the rest of the world that was founded before 1981, and that operates in one of the remaining business sectors, with priority year prior to 1986.
0.310
combined with pre-1986 no oppositions 0.155 0.214
Owner characteristics
Patent characteristics
